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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the recent process of state decentralisation in Italy from the 
perspectives of political science and constitutional law. It considers the 
conflicting pressures and partisan opportunism of the decentralising process, and 
how these have adversely affected the consistency and completeness of the new 
constitutional framework. The paper evaluates the major institutional reforms 
affecting state decentralisation, including the 2001 constitutional reform and the 
more recent legislation on fiscal federalism. It argues that while the legal 
framework for decentralisation remains unclear and contradictory in parts, the 
Constitutional Court has performed a key role in interpreting the provisions and 
giving life to the decentralised system, in which regional governments now 
perform a much more prominent role. This new system of more decentralised 
multi-level government must nevertheless contend with a political culture and 
party system that remains highly centralised, while the administrative apparatus 
has undergone no comparable shift to  take account of state decentralisation, 
leading to the duplication of bureaucracy at all territorial levels and continuing 
conflicts over policy jurisdiction. Unlike in federal systems these conflicts cannot 
be resolved in Italy through mechanisms of “shared rule”, since formal inter-
governmental coordination structure are weak and entirely consultative.  
  
 
Authors 
 
Francesco Palermo is Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Law 
Department of the University of Verona and Director of the Institute for Studies 
on Federalism and Regionalism of the European Academy Bolzano/Bozen 
(EURAC). 
Alex Wilson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Vesalius College, Free 
University of Brussels (VUB). He is an expert on Italian and Spanish politics.  
 
The authors can be reached by e-mail at  francesco.palermo@eurac.edu  and 
alex.wilson@vub.ac.be 
 
Key words 
 
Italy  -  Constitutional Reform -  Institutional Change  -  Fiscal Federalism - 
Constitutional Court - Political Parties - Inter-governmental Relations.  Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap    edap@eurac.edu 
 
Table of contents 
 
1. Introduction ....................................................................... 5 
 
2. Dynamics of Decentralisation in Italy  .......................................... 6 
 
3. Regions in the Unitary State .................................................... 7 
 
4. Institutional Reforms and Constitutional Amendments (1996-2001) ...... 8 
 
5. The Failure of Federal Reform (2001-6) ..................................... 10 
 
6. Fiscal Federalism (2008-2011) ................................................ 12 
 
7. Constitutional Adjudication ................................................... 15 
7.1 Political organization of the Regions  ..................................... 17 
7.2 Competences ................................................................ 18 
 
8. Inter-governmental Relations  ................................................. 19 
 
9. Conclusion ....................................................................... 21 
 
10. Bibliography .................................................................... 23 
 
 
 Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap    5  edap@eurac.edu 
The Dynamics of Decentralization in Italy: 
Towards a Federal Solution?  
Francesco Palermo and Alex Wilson  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Italy has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent decades: moving 
from a historically centralized unitary state organized along Napoleonic lines, 
to a more decentralized state with some federal features yet nested within a 
bureaucratic organization and political culture that remains highly 
centralized. Major reforms to the political system and constitutional design 
have been enacted, often approved unilaterally by the governing coalition 
under electoral or coalitional pressure from the Northern League. The 
resulting arrangements suffer from a lack of legal clarity, contain 
contradictory elements, and are rarely supported by adequate implementing 
legislation. The central state apparatus has not been reformed in any 
significant way to take account of regionalization, leading to disputes over 
policy competences with regional governments, as well as the proliferation 
and duplication of bureaucracy at all levels. An embittered political climate 
and frequent legislative paralysis has meant these inconsistencies in 
institutional design are largely resolved through constitutional adjudication, 
with the Constitutional Court performing an assertive role in determining how 
legal provisions should be interpreted and the system should work. Yet this is 
unlikely to be sufficient in resolving inherent weaknesses in the system, 
including the lack of “shared rule” mechanisms at national level, consistent 
with an increasingly regionalized (but not fully federalized) political system. 
Formal mechanisms of inter-governmental relations now exist but are weak, 
with central institutions and actors having the final say on competence and 
resource allocation for ordinary regions. The consolidation of lobby groups for 
territorial governments represents an important advancement in informal 
mechanisms of inter-governmental relations, which have made the 
consultative formal mechanisms more relevant. Directly elected territorial 
leaders have become assertive political actors vis-à-vis the central 
government, introducing a further centrifugal dynamic in the system that 
counters the centripetal tendency of national parties.  
 Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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2. Dynamics of Decentralisation in Italy  
As in many other countries, the dynamics of decentralization in Italy have 
often appeared to follow a partisan logic.
1 Since the 1990s, this has been 
driven by the need for national parties to compete electorally or form 
governing coalitions with the Northern League, a powerful autonomist party 
that shifts between extremely radical proposals (e.g. secession) to bolster its 
core support, and more moderate proposals on state design (e.g. enhanced 
regional powers within a federal state), designed to produce a workable 
parliamentary reform.
2 An effect of this constant pressure has been to ensure 
that proposals for state decentralization overcome the general inertia of 
legislative decision-making in Italy, as well as the hurdle of intra-party 
differences and inter-party divisions. These are inevitable in a country with 
strong cultural differences and an economic gulf between North and South, 
yet the result has been a partial and inconsistent reform of the political 
system, hindered by the divergent preferences of actors in both centre-left 
and centre-right coalitions. Whereas the centre-right coalition has adopted 
reforms under coalitional pressure from the Northern League, on which 
successive Berlusconi governments have relied on for their parliamentary 
majority, the centre-left coalition has seen the Northern League as an 
electoral (even existential) threat in northern regions, to be countered by 
credible decentralizing reforms. But the dynamics of decentralization in Italy 
cannot be entirely explained by the need to accommodate a powerful 
regionalist challenger. Federalism is increasingly accepted as a desirable form 
of state design across the political spectrum, with all main parties 
incorporating it into their electoral manifestos. Despite partisan pressures 
and electoral opportunism in the timing and content of legislative reforms, 
there is some degree of continuity in the actions of the Italian parliament, 
with approved reforms heavily modeled on earlier legislative proposals. There 
are also several instances of parliamentary consensus on decentralizing 
reforms, particularly where these improve efficiency or accountability in the 
political system, but without undermining the interests of national 
parliamentarians. Yet this apparent federalist consensus masks major intra-
party and inter-party differences over what federalism implies for the state in 
terms of policy divergence, fiscal capacity, and welfare provision.
3  The 
combination of a vague political consensus on federal reform and its 
inevitable subordination to partisan pressures has led to a series of reforms 
that, while often substantial in content and pervasive in scope, are 
incomplete at the time of approval, not fully implemented by successive 
governments, and sometimes contradictory in nature. The result of these 
 
 
1   Thomas Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 
2003); Martino Mazzoleni,  “The Italian regionalization: a story of partisan logics”, 14(2) Modern 
Italy 2009, 135-415. 
2   Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics 
(Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2001). 
3   Michael Keating and Alex Wilson, “Reforming Italy: Institutional Change and the Federal Option”, 
Edinburgh Europa Paper Series 2010.  Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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legislative failings has been that the precise allocation of competences and 
key questions of regional autonomy have been left to constitutional 
adjudication. Administrative decentralisation has allowed regional 
bureaucracies to flourish, but without any comparable reduction in the size 
or scope of the central government. This has made decentralizing reforms 
more costly than envisaged by their promoters, while encouraging the central 
bureaucracy to continue micro-managing policy areas that should, in 
principle, have been largely devolved to regional governments. 
 
3. Regions in the Unitary State  
With the achievement of national unity in the 1860s, the Italian State was 
modeled according to the French blueprint of a centralized and bureaucratic 
administration, with various federal options rejected.
4 It was only with the 
republican Constitution of 1948 that an innovative but rather limited 
experiment with regionalization began. Italian regionalism has always been 
characterized by its asymmetrical design, both as a matter of constitutional 
law and in the effective use of powers transferred to the regions. At first, 
only five “special” regions were established, all situated in the periphery: 
three Alpine regions with large linguistic minorities (Val d’Aosta, Trentino-
South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia), and the two main islands of Sicily and 
Sardinia. Each of them is guaranteed autonomy by a “special statute”, a basic 
law with constitutional rank. Although regionalization of the whole country 
was laid down in the 1948 Constitution, it was only implemented in the 1970s 
after an agreement between the governing Christian Democrats and the 
opposition Communists saw the “ordinary” regions set up. These were granted 
very limited (and entirely symmetrical) legislative powers and fiscal 
capacity.
5  To ensure their capacity to wield even these limited powers, 
regional governments were forced down the path of constitutional 
adjudication, as there is (still) no effective institutional representation of 
regional interests at central level.
6  These conflicts and a jurisdiction 
underlining the necessity of cooperation and consultation, led to the gradual 
emancipation of the regional level into a system that has been characterized 
as “cooperative regionalism”. Until the party system crisis in the 1990s, there 
was little sense this would evolve into a quasi-federal arrangement based on 
significantly enhanced powers for regional governments. Yet as the governing 
parties collapsed under the weight of corruption scandals, the Northern 
League made strong electoral advances by linking political corruption to 
excessive state centralisation. Autonomist demands from the Northern League 
and other party actors contributed to shaping a new fluid political context, 
 
 
4   Daniel Ziblatt,  Structuring the State. The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of 
Federalism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006). 
5   David Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism, and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in 
Historical Perspective” in Carl Levy (ed.), Italian Regionalism: History, Identity & Politics (Berg, 
Oxford, 1996); Martino Mazzoleni, “The Italian regionalization…” 
6   Roberto Bin, “Veri e falsi problem del federalismo in Italia” in Luigi Mariucci et al. (eds.),  Il 
federalismo preso sul serio (il Mulino, Bologna, 1996), 61-78. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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where more ambitious attempts were made to regionalize the political 
system. Yet the Northern League remains a centralized party that has 
reinforced the pattern of negotiating state decentralization entirely at the 
level of national parties and institutions. Regional and local governments (of 
all sizes) remain largely excluded from determining the processes and forms 
of institutional change. Although the Northern League is active at all levels of 
government, its territorial units largely play a supporting role by rehearsing 
nationally formulated policies and enacting symbolic campaigns promoted by 
party leaders.
7  There has been no real attempt to negotiate levels of 
autonomy at local or regional levels.  
 
4. Institutional Reforms and Constitutional Amendments (1996-
2001)  
Major decentralizing reforms were approved by centre-left governments 
between 1996 and 2001, without strong legislative input from the Northern 
League, but under pressure from a party that had obtained its strongest vote 
share in the 1996 general election (over 20% in northern Italy). This 
engendered a clear political need to supply some form of autonomist reforms, 
particularly as the centre-left coalition had performed poorly in large 
northern regions such as Lombardy and Veneto, now strongholds of the 
Northern League. The first measures approved can be described as 
administrative decentralization. Known as the Bassanini reforms (1997-8), 
these rationalized public administration by granting each territorial level of 
government sufficient capacity and autonomy to pursue policies that had 
been allocated by the Constitution.
8 This contributed to regionalization of the 
national health-care system, a long process that culminated in the Bindi 
reforms (1999-2000),  which shifted management of health-care to regional 
governments and provided some own resources for this task, alongside 
continued transfers from the central government.
9  Another institutional 
reform established the direct election of regional presidents,  replacing a 
parliamentary system whereby regional presidents were nominated and (very 
frequently) replaced by parties in the legislature.
10 This reform required a 
Constitutional amendment to become effective in ordinary regions (1999) and 
most special regions (2001). Both amendments were approved with broad 
cross-party support in parliament, but without formal consultation of the 
regions concerned. These changes inadvertently created a tension between 
the interests of political elites at central level (nominated and promoted by 
 
 
7   Nicole Bolleyer, Joost van Spanje and Alex Wilson, “New Parties in Government: Party Organization 
and the Costs of Public Office”, 35(5) West European Politics 2012, 971-998. 
8   Mark Gilbert, “The  Bassanini Laws: A half-way house in local government reform”  in Hine and 
Vassallo (eds.), Italian Politics: A Review (Berghahn, Oxford, 2000). 
9   Franca Maino, “The restructuring of the health service: The Bindi reform and fiscal federalism” in 
Mario Caciagli and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), Italian Politics… 
10   Gianfranco Baldini and Salvatore Vassallo, “The Regions in Search of a New Institutional Identity” in 
Mario Caciagli and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), Italian Politics…  
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party leaders) and those of regional or local leaders (directly elected or 
replaced by citizens), which is relevant for our understanding of inter-
governmental relations (see Part 8). 
Although a Bicameral Commission (1997-8) was set up to develop workable 
proposals on broader constitutional reform, this collapsed because of partisan 
conflict.
11  Yet some of its proposals were implemented in a constitutional 
reform approved exclusively by centre-left parties, in less than a year 
between the 2000 regional elections and the 2001 general election. This was 
a remarkable timeframe given the need for two separate votes in both houses 
of parliament, each with an absolute majority. The trigger was the heavy 
centre-left defeat in the 2000 regional elections, particularly in northern 
regions where the Northern League had returned to the centre-right 
coalition. Given the rushed timing and opportunistic objectives underlying 
this legislation, centre-right parties opposed its ratification in parliament and 
sought a confirmative referendum, which can be convoked when 
constitutional reforms are approved by under 2/3 of the parliament. The 
ensuing referendum was held in October 2001, after the centre-right coalition 
had won the general election and formed a  new government. The YES 
campaign won convincingly with over 64% of the national vote and a majority 
in all regions except tiny Val d’Aosta. Centre-left parties presented a united 
front while most centre-right parties were internally divided. The Northern 
League pushed for abstention, claiming the reform was pointless as it did not 
significantly advance regional autonomy, and would be replaced with more 
radical changes sponsored by the League in government. Yet the 2001 
constitutional reform merits closer consideration because it continues to 
represent the basis for the territorial design of the Italian state, since the 
alternative centre-right reform ultimately failed.  
The 2001 constitutional reform completely reshaped the constitutional 
provisions on the relations between State and regions, often according to 
previous jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The equality of all 
component units of the “Republic” (State, Regions, Provinces, Metropolitan 
Cities, Municipalities) was emphasized alongside the concept of functional 
“spheres” rather than hierarchical levels of government.12 The “two track 
asymmetry” – ordinary and special status regions – is confirmed, but single 
ordinary regions may request additional powers to be transferred to them by 
the State after an act of parliament (article 116.3),
13 although in practice this 
asymmetry in competence allocation has never been granted by the Italian 
parliament. More significantly, the reform drastically changes the distribution 
of legislative and administrative powers between State and regions: the 
Constitution (article 117) now lists all legislative powers of the State as well 
 
 
11   Martin Bull and Gianfranco Pasquino, “A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy”, 30(4) 
West European Politics 2007, 670-691. 
12   Article 114 const., as amended in 2001 reads: “The Republic is composed of the Municipalities, the 
Provinces, the Metropolitan Cities, the Regions and the State”. 
13   Francesco Palermo, “Il regionalismo differenziato”, in Tania Groppi and Marco Olivetti (eds.), La 
Repubblica delle autonomie. Regioni ed enti locali nel nuovo Titolo V (Giappichelli 2nd ed., Torino, 
2003), 55-62. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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as the fields of concurrent legislation (i.e. where regions can legislate only 
within the framework of general guidelines determined by a national law), 
with all other fields left to the regions. Management of health-care became 
entirely devolved to regional governments, which also gained an enhanced 
role in, inter alia, economic development and professional training. 
Administrative powers were no longer connected with legislative ones, but 
distributed in a flexible manner according to the criteria of “subsidiarity, 
differentiation and proportionality” (article 118). The new provision on fiscal 
federalism granted partial financial autonomy to sub-national entities (article 
119) but required implementing legislation. All regions were required to 
establish a consultative body for the representation of local authorities within 
their territory (article 123). The elimination of preventive State  control 
(before the reform, all regional laws had to be approved by the government 
before entering into force) marked the equal rank of regional and State 
legislation, but also prompted another escalation in adjudication to the 
Constitutional Court, as regions and the State sought legal clarification over 
their respective policy spheres (see Part 7). 
Although some constitutional amendments had immediate effect, in 
particular the new distribution of legislative powers, the new lists were 
revealed to be incomplete and contained many overlaps, giving rise to an 
enormous increase of controversies. In practice the Constitutional Court had 
to face the fundamental task of re-defining competences,
14 and frequently 
this led to the justification of an expanding role of the State: through the 
assumption of “cross-cutting issues” instead of narrow competence-matters, 
and the interpretation of the State as guardian of a “national interest”, the 
Court in several occasions supported a rather centralistic interpretation of 
the new distribution of competences. A second set of reform provisions 
required further legislation on details, such as the new financial relations 
between layers of government. The second Berlusconi government (2001-6) 
showed little interest in completing the reform inherited from its 
predecessor, while the Northern League advanced its competing 
Constitutional reform proposals. Two implementing laws were finally adopted 
in 2003 (law no. 131) and 2005 (law no. 11), giving life to some amended 
provisions of the Constitution, but this did not come close to the range of 
implementing legislation actually required. The issue of financial relations 
remained unresolved, as the envisaged system of fiscal federalism was only 
approved a full decade later by the parliament (see Part 6). 
 
5. The Failure of Federal Reform (2001-6) 
The second Berlusconi government (2001-6) eventually approved its own 
constitutional reform after several years of tortuous negotiations between 
the Northern League and statewide parties in the governing coalition. The 
Northern League insisted on creating a new Ministry of Institutional Reform 
 
 
14   Roberto Bin, “I criteri di individuazione delle materie”, 5 Le Regioni 2006, 889-902. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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and allocating the post to their party leader Umberto Bossi, to clearly display 
their sponsorship of the proposal. Although federal reform was a condition of 
the pre-electoral and governing alliance between the Northern League and 
the rest of the centre-right coalition, the precise details were not agreed in 
advance. The outcome of intense negotiations was an ambitious but rather 
incoherent reform package that sought to appease different parties in the 
governing coalition through a series of somewhat contradictory concessions. 
Approved unilaterally by centre-right legislators in November 2005, it was 
rejected by Italian voters in a confirmative referendum held in June 2006.  
The key Northern League demand for regional devolution was met through 
a modest increase in ‘exclusive’ regional competences (local policing, school 
administration), but fell well short of initial demands made by the party 
leadership. The central government re-gained certain competences, including 
a residual control of norms on health-care; a renewed control over national 
transport infrastructures and energy networks; and exclusive competences in 
the areas of job security, communications and  professional qualifications. 
Other provisions sought to reverse some aspects of the 2001 constitutional 
reform, including a new clause allowing the Senate to suspend any regional 
law that contravened the ‘national interest’ within 30 days of its 
promulgation, and the abolition of a clause that allowed asymmetrical 
competences to be granted to specific ordinary regions.
15 The most radical 
aspect of this reform was the attempt to transform Italy into an explicitly 
‘federal state’, through a dramatic change in the composition and election of 
the parliament, with the attribution of different competences to the 
Chamber and Senate.
16 Another feature was a stronger Prime Minister, who 
would be solely responsible for nominating and dismissing ministers, and 
could determine the dissolution of the Chamber (presently a function of the 
President). The PM would be directly elected via a formal link to the winning 
party list, avoiding a parliamentary vote of confidence. The PM could later 
only be removed from office by his own governing majority, which would 
need to achieve a ‘constructive’ vote of no confidence in the Chamber to do 
so.  
Yet this package failed to convince voters. The centre-left coalition 
(having just returned to government) campaigned compactly for a NO vote in 
the confirmative referendum, arguing that the proposal was grossly 
incoherent and socially divisive. Centre-right politicians were half-hearted in 
their support, with only the Northern League campaigning actively. This 
helped to produce a majority for the YES vote in the large northern regions of 
Veneto and Lombardy, but failed to counter-balance the overwhelming NO 
vote (61%) in the country as a whole. The reform was particularly 
unsuccessful in central regions dominated by the centre-left coalition (known 
as the “Red Belt”), as well as all southern regions. Although a number of 
 
 
15   Salvatore Vassallo, “The Constitutional Reforms of the Centre-Right”, in Carlo Guarnieri and James 
L. Newell (eds.), Italian Politics… 
16   For more details see Marco Cammelli, “Una riforma costituzionale che non va”, 3 Il Mulino 2004, 
397-414. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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similar constitutional proposals have since been debated in parliament, they 
have lacked sufficient momentum for implementation. This has made it even 
more necessary to fully implement the 2001 constitutional reform, including 
its fiscal provisions. 
 
6. Fiscal Federalism (2008-2011) 
Popular rejection of the centre-right constitutional reform was linked to the 
difficulty in getting nationwide approval for a reform so heavily promoted by 
the divisive Northern League. Accepting this setback and taking some comfort 
from the high YES vote in its electoral heartlands of Lombardy and Veneto, 
the Northern League campaigned in the 2008 general election for a system of 
‘fiscal federalism’ to safeguard the financial interests of northern taxpayers. 
There was a heavy dose of realism here: fiscal legislation can be approved 
without the complexities (and referendums) of constitutional revision, and 
directly addresses the concerns of northern voters more interested in the 
economic aspects of federalism than its institutional features. Possibilities for 
cross-party agreement were higher since ‘fiscal federalism’ would also 
complete the centre-left constitutional reform, which foresaw implementing 
legislation on financial relations between levels of government (art. 119 
const.). A reform package was eventually pushed through the parliament with 
concerted effort by the Northern League, which got the legislation approved 
despite the chronic instability of the third Berlusconi government (2008-11). 
Broad cross-party support was certainly achieved at national level, with no 
party sensing any political traction to be gained from opposing a complex but 
fairly logical reform whose implementation would be diluted in time. The 
reform was more contentious for territorial governments, which sought to 
organize collectively to address elements of the legislation that damaged 
their financial position (see Part 8). 
The asymmetrical nature of constitutional design in Italy is particularly 
visible when it comes to fiscal arrangements. To a variable degree, all five 
special regions enjoy more favourable financial arrangements than the fifteen 
ordinary regions. These disparities are often justified in political and 
economic terms: the three special regions in the North host more or less 
sizeable national minorities, while the other two are economically backward 
islands in the South. When it comes to finances, each special region has a 
different agreement with the State, mostly regulated in its respective 
regional basic law, which has constitutional rank. In general, all financial 
arrangements are quite generous with the special regions compared to the 
ordinary ones.
17 The latter have some allocated resources but nevertheless 
 
 
17   Enrico Buglione, “Aspetti finanziari della specielità delle Regioni a statuto differenziato”, in Antonio 
Ferrara and Giulio Maria Salerno (eds.),  Le nuove specialità nella riforma dell’ordinamento 
regional, (Giuffrè Milano, 2003), 205-242. Enrico Buglione, “Una prima valutazione degli accordi ex 
legge 42/2009 conclusi dalle regioni speciali e dalle province autonome”  in Francesco Palermo, 
Elisabeth Alber and Sara Parolari (eds.), Federalismo fiscale: una sfida comparata (Cedam, Padova, 
2011), 307-322. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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rely heavily on fiscal transfers from the central government to finance their 
ordinary expenditure. These central transfers have come under immense 
strain recently due to the economic and fiscal crisis in Italy, so sub-national 
governments need to raise  their own revenues as well as contain their 
spending within limits. Further pressure on fiscal reform came from a large 
number of municipalities belonging to ordinary regions that bordered special 
ones. These municipalities initiated the complex procedure to be attached to 
the special regions, largely to take advantage of the improved fiscal 
environment there, prompting national legislators to pursue a more 
comprehensive reform of financial arrangements at territorial levels.
18  
Italy retains a rather centralistic arrangement for the collection and 
distribution of revenues, with most taxes collected by the State and 
distributed to the regions (and municipalities) according to criteria laid down 
in the national legislation and based on “historic expenditure”, i.e. the basis 
for the financial transfer is in principle the expenditure of the previous year. 
Except for a few specific levies, ordinary regions (and their local authorities) 
cannot establish their own taxes. Ordinary regions also have little influence in 
determining the criteria for the distribution of financial resources, as they 
have little weight in the decision-making process at national level (although 
their consultation is mandatory). More worryingly, there is very little 
incentive for regions and  municipalities to be virtuous as to their 
expenditure: to some extent the higher the spending, the higher the basis for 
next year’s financial transfer from the State. Bail-outs of insolvent 
administrations remain worryingly commonplace. The 2001 constitutional 
reform sought to radically change this system by granting the sub-national 
layers of government financial autonomy with respect to revenue and 
expenditures. Article 119 provided that regions and municipalities (as well as 
provinces) should set and levy taxes and collect revenues of their own, while 
the State can allocate additional resources and must set up an equalization 
fund for territories with lower per-capita fiscal capacity. Yet implementing 
legislation was not adopted to put these principles into practice and this 
lacuna has adversely affected the whole federalizing process in Italy. 
The first serious attempt to implement the constitutional framework on 
financial relations was made by the centre-left Prodi government in 2007. A 
draft law was presented for the implementation of article 119 of the 
Constitution, generally following a cautious line by stressing inter-territorial 
solidarity and focusing on equalization rather than specifying the taxation 
powers of regions. Due to the early dissolution of parliament, this legislation 
 
 
18   The complex procedure for shifting regional borders is laid down in article 132.2 of the 
Constitution: it requires that the concerned municipality approves its separation from one region 
and its incorporation into another by popular referendum, with the support of an absolute majority 
of resident voters. Following the positive out come of the referendum, a national law is required, 
on which the parliaments of both involved regions should be consulted but without a formal veto. 
Although referenda were successfully held in several municipalities, no change of border took place 
and it is very unlikely this will ever happen. Not only is the new legislation on “fiscal federalism” 
aimed at blocking the migration of municipalities towards the special regions, but for political 
reasons the Italian parliament has always refused to adopt the required legislation, in order to avoid 
a proliferation of new claims for transfer across adjacent regions. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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was never adopted. In summer 2008, the third Berlusconi government 
presented a different proposal that was later submitted to parliament. This 
was modeled on a reform proposal supported by the regional government of 
Lombardy: a relatively rare case of a regional government setting the policy 
agenda on state decentralization in Italy. This reform was adopted in a 
relatively short time (May 2009, law no. 42/2009), with support from across 
the political spectrum, including the centre-left parties now in opposition. 
The details are contained in a series of by-laws that will enter into force over 
a period of 7 years, i.e. the new system will only be fully operational in 2016. 
This dilution in time was the political compromise needed to guarantee strong 
parliamentary support. The by-laws were adopted by the end of 2011, 
although some require further specification in the form of government 
regulations.  
The new system provides all regions with transfers and equalization 
concerning “essential services” (heath care, welfare, education): these are to 
be granted irrespective of the financial performance of each region. As for 
other areas including, inter alia, administration costs and public transport, 
regions will either have to increase their own taxes or be equalized based on 
benchmarks determined by the State. The criterion of “historic expenditure” 
will be replaced: equalization transfers to regions and other sub-national 
governments will be based on “standard costs”, as determined by a 
specialized commission composed by representatives of the national 
government and of the regions (and municipalities). This means that 
inefficient and poorly managed regions will receive much less funding from 
the State, so will have to increase taxes or cut costs in other areas to 
continue providing “essential services”. 
While this reform allows regions and municipalities to collect their own 
taxes in potentially all fields of their competence, including as a means to 
collect additional resources should transfers from the State be insufficient 
(which is likely in future), there is rather limited room for regions and 
municipalities to actually do so. This is due to the constitutional principle 
which prohibits double taxation: since no activity or good can be taxed twice, 
and almost all taxes are determined by the State and partly transferred to 
the regions and municipalities, there is little room for new regional or 
municipal taxation, except in very few areas where no State taxation already 
exists. Almost all regional revenues will therefore continue to be based on 
shares of State taxes rather than on own levies. Municipal taxation is likely to 
rely heavily on property taxes, which are not taxed centrally. 
An unusual feature of this legislation was that the by-laws were approved 
exclusively by the national government, with no role for the parliament and 
only limited consultation of territorial governments. This may have been 
necessary to achieve a compromise between the potential losers of the 
reform (mainly southern regions) and the potential winners (more efficient 
northern regions), but this approach is neither very “federalistic” nor 
particularly inclusive. As for the special regions, they kept their asymmetrical 
status by negotiating new financial arrangements bilaterally with the national 
government, although the law clearly states that they should participate in Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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the overall equalization system (article 27 law 42/2009). In practice, the 
financial advantages of special regions have been considerably reduced, in 
exchange for more clarity and control over their own fiscal revenues. 
It is beyond doubt that the old system of territorial financing had to be 
reformed, as it contained tremendous disparities in the financial treatment of 
the various regions. Only seven regions spent less money than they produced 
in economic terms, while all the others (53% of the population) spent more – 
in several cases a lot more – than they generated in terms of fiscal revenue.
19 
Regions and municipalities currently raise own revenues for only 22% of their 
budgets, while their overall expenditure is 54% of the national total. This 
means there is little direct political responsibility for public expenditure at 
sub-national levels of government.
20 Yet the objectives of fiscal federalism 
remain ambiguous: are the new arrangements a means to increase the 
autonomy of the regions, to reduce public expenditure, or to promote inter-
territorial solidarity? Political actors are heavily divided on this question, 
which may lead to difficulties in future implementation. Another concern is 
the growth in bureaucracy at territorial levels, with no concomitant reduction 
in the size of the central bureaucracy. Not only is this unsustainable given 
high levels of public debt in Italy, it also runs counter to the spirit of the 2001 
constitutional reform, which envisaged many legislative competences being 
devolved to regional governments.
21  Not all regional governments have 
sufficient policy expertise to fulfill their range of functions, with wide 
variations in institutional capacity and performance leading to de facto 
asymmetry in the exercise of regional competences,
22  although the latter 
remain symmetrical in de iure terms. The central bureaucracy retains 
substantial expertise in policy areas that have been transferred (either 
partially or fully) to regional governments, encouraging it to behave as if 
nothing much has changed despite major institutional change. 
 
7. Constitutional Adjudication  
Political bargaining over the form of state design in Italy has produced a 
system that is now more decentralized, but a constitutional framework that is 
 
 
19   For example,  every citizen of Lombardy pays average taxes of 13.700 euros a year, while the 
expenses for services on the territory of that region are 8.850 euros per citizen; conversely, 
Calabria receives pro capita 2.750 euros a year more than it generates. 
20   Health-care makes up the most significant regional expenditure and has so far produced debts of      
45 billion Euros. These need to be covered by the State budget in order for regions to continue 
providing ordinary services, raising doubts about whether ‘fiscal  federalism’ can resolve such 
structural problems in government financing.  
21    Over two-thirds of civil servants are State employees (including almost all teachers), while less than 
one-third work for regional or local governments (in the case of regional governments, these are 
mainly employees in the health-care system). This situation continutes despite the fact that 
municipalities and regions are formally responsible for all administrative duties that not attributed 
to the State, according to the principle of subsidiarity (art. 118 const.). 
22   Robert Putnam and Robert Leonardi and Raffaela Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions 
in Modern Italy  (Princeton University Press, Princeton,  1993); Salvatore Vassallo,  Le Regioni: 
Capitale Sociale, Equilibri Politici e Rendimento Istituzionale: Rapporto di Ricerca  (Istituto 
Cattaneo, Bologna, 2009). Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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unclear and often incomplete, with limited guidance on the respective policy 
spheres of central and regional governments, and continued interference by 
the central bureaucracy in regional matters. As a result, most contentious 
issues have been resolved in some way by the Constitutional Court, which has 
been performing this role for at least three decades, and is likely to continue 
doing so for years to come. 
Constitutional litigation was initially the only way for the regions to affirm 
their rights and ultimately to establish themselves after their creation in the 
1970s. The most active regions learned to use constitutional adjudication for 
political purposes, intentionally losing the case but bringing the Court to 
make important statements as to the limits of State jurisdiction.
23  This 
strategy was combined with partisan political agendas: nearly all significant 
inter-governmental constitutional litigation was prompted by regions 
governed by the Communist Party, which was in opposition at national level. 
To force institutional cooperation irrespective of partisan incongruence, the 
Constitutional Court has to a large extent invented Italian regionalism and 
brought it into a more mature stage. In this respect, the principle of mutual 
and loyal cooperation between the State and regions has played a decisive 
role, first by obliging the State to consult the regions in a number of matters 
of regional concern, then by putting a limit to regional aspirations with 
regard to the power to decide alone without asking the consent of the State. 
The role of the Court became even more decisive after the adoption of the 
2001 constitutional reform. The situation became even more difficult than in 
the early stages: while the overall centralistic attitude of the State 
continued, the Constitution provided for an advanced federal framework in 
which the regions are responsible for many policy issues whereas the State 
only plays a subsidiary role.  While some regions remained passive about 
asserting their new competences, others tried to test the new limits of their 
jurisdiction and approved legislation that was contested by the State. The 
question of partisan incongruence was relevant: most inter-governmental 
litigation occurred between national governments led by the centre-right and 
regions governed by the centre-left. The Court was suddenly caught between 
the necessity of making the new constitutional framework work and the need 
to stop excessive  regional activism. At the same time, the Court had to 
develop a consistent doctrine over a text that is far from consistent. The 
division of legislative and administrative powers proved to be particularly 
unclear: according to article 117 of the constitution, there is a concurrent 
legislative competence for the “national production, transport and 
distribution of energy” (which technically makes it impossible for the State to 
have a national energy policy); the State has exclusive jurisdiction on the 
“protection of the environment, the ecosystem and cultural heritage”, but 
the regions have concurrent competence for “cultural and environmental 
assets”; nothing is said with regard to traffic and rules on circulation, with 
the consequence that these are theoretically exclusive regional powers; 
 
 
23   Robert Bin, “L’importanza di perdere la causa”, 6 Le Regioni 1995, at 1012. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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nothing is said as to the coordination of the legislation enacted before and 
after the reform. And finally, without implementing the provisions on fiscal 
federalism, most of the new regional powers remained for long time on paper 
because resources to pursue them were lacking – and continue to be scarce in 
the current financial situation. In simple terms, the new framework was not 
workable and the Court was the only institution that could fill it with life. 
In the aftermath of the 2001 constitutional reform, the number of cases 
brought to the Court concerning litigation between the State and regions 
decuplicated. In practice, the Court determined (and largely re-wrote) the 
division of legislative and administrative powers laid down by the reform. 
Only after some years, when the case-law had established the interpretative 
principles, did the litigation significantly decrease.
24 When the legislation on 
fiscal federalism will be fully implemented, we can expect a new wave of 
challenges to take place.
25 The case law on state decentralization is clearly 
too extensive for this article, but is useful to highlight some key decisions 
taken on the political organization and policy competences of regional 
governments. 
7.1 Political organization of the Regions 
The Court was called to bring clarity on the form of regional government. 
Judgment 2/2004 was a landmark in this respect. Article 122.5 of the 
Constitution (as amended in 2001) provides that the regional president “shall 
be elected by universal and direct suffrage, unless the regional basic law 
provides otherwise”. The President can appoint and dismiss his or her 
cabinet. If the President leaves office, dies, or is dismissed by the regional 
legislature, new elections are automatically called. Alternatively, any region 
can go for the parliamentary model, with the president elected or replaced 
by the legislature.
26  The region of Calabria drafted its new basic law 
providing for a hybrid between the two models: the president (and vice-
president) had to be formally elected by the assembly but with no discretion, 
as the legislature was bound to elect the presidential ticket that obtained the 
most votes: in case it did not, the assembly was dissolved and new elections 
called. Yet after the election, the assembly retained the power to dismiss the 
president. The system was controversial because the president was directly 
elected but could be dismissed at any time by the legislature, which 
undermined his/her capacity to exercise regional leadership. The Court made 
clear that the Constitution only provides for an “either-or”: if the 
presidential system is adopted then its full consequences should also be 
 
 
24  See at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/informazione/statistiche.asp  
25   Giandomenico Falcon, “Che cosa attendersi, e che cosa non attendersi, dal federalismo fiscale”, 4-5 
Le Regioni 2008, 765-770. 
26  So far only two regions have opted to retain the parliamentary system: South Tyrol (Autonomous 
Province of Bolzano) and Val d’Aosta. These are the only two regions which were politically stable 
before the direct election of the regional president was introduced, and did not feel the need to 
adopt the new system. Both are governed by autonomist parties supported by linguistic minorities in 
the region (see Annex 1). Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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accepted, and if a parliamentary system is chosen then the assembly cannot 
be constrained in its power to elect the president. The draft basic law of 
Calabria was struck down and had to be rewritten, with a presidential system 
eventually adopted. This decision paved the way for all other regional basic 
laws to be adopted,
27 and in every case so far regional governments have 
opted for the direct election of regional presidents, since this option is most 
popular among voters. 
7.2 Competences 
Judgment no. 282/2002 was the first decision in which the Court was called 
to interpret the scope of the 2001 constitutional reform: the central 
government contested a law of the region Marche on the basis of the previous 
criteria for the division of competences, and the region claimed its newly 
acquired power to legislate on issues such as health care and doctors’ 
admissions. The Court recognized the new constitutional framework and the 
decision was a landmark for subsequent judgments on the division of powers, 
although it also clarified that some “cross-cutting” clauses, such as the 
State’s exclusive power to determine the essential levels of protection of 
fundamental civil and social rights (art. 117.2 lit m const.), might trump the 
constitutional division of powers. It is fair to say that the Court was initially 
quite restrictive as to the symbolic dimension of the reform, but at the same 
time quite forthcoming to the new regional powers, and clearly dismissed the 
national government’s attitude of continuing to behave as if nothing much 
had changed. 
Yet the most revolutionary judgment on the division of competences 
between the State and the regions was issued in 2003. In its seminal decision 
no. 303/2003 (prompted by a bi-partisan appeal of several regions), the 
Constitutional Court established that, whenever the State believes that an 
administrative role in a matter of regional competence (and thus vested in 
the regions) needs to be performed at State level to achieve better results 
than those that can be expected by the regions, a State law can take that 
role away from the regions and vest it in the national government, in 
accordance with the principle of vertical subsidiarity. The State, however, is 
bound to obtain the assent (by agreement) of the interested regions, in 
accordance with the constitutional principles of subsidiarity and co-operation 
in good faith. This judgment had a tremendous impact on the constitutional 
division of powers: on the one hand, it transforms a rigid catalogue of 
competences into a flexible one, based on subsidiarity. On the other hand, it 
forces cooperation between the State and regions in some very important 
areas such as the realization of large infrastructural projects, with an 
increasing effort to make the State and regional policies converge. 
 
 
27  In 2012, the process of adopting new statutes was completed in all ordinary regions, while no 
special region has adopted a new statute so far. Palermo and Wilson – Decentralization in Italy 
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Other relevant jurisprudence concerns the scope of regional basic laws. 
Some new regional basic laws (Tuscany, Umbria and Emilia-Romagna, all ruled 
by a centre-left coalition) contained a catalogue of fundamental rights, some 
of which went beyond the specific provisions of the Constitution, or at least 
against the mainstream interpretation of it. The principle of equality was 
interpreted to include the rights of same sex couples in areas such as housing, 
assistance, and pensions. Bioethical issues included the right to be informed 
about any medical treatment. The Court was asked whether and to what 
extent the regional basic laws could provide for fundamental rights, given 
that their protection is clearly a reserved State matter. The Court found that 
the contested provisions are simply declaratory, indicating political goals that 
are not legally binding. Therefore, the regions are allowed to include them in 
their basic laws, but they cannot have legal effect (judgments no. 378 and 
379/2004). 
 
8. Inter-governmental Relations  
The absence in Italy of institutional mechanisms for regional representation in 
national decision-making (“shared rule”) has become inconsistent with the 
substantial advancements in “self rule” for regional governments described 
earlier, and has become a major lacuna in terms of institutional design. This 
is partly because the Senate does not function as a territorial chamber. 
Senators are elected in multi-member regional constituencies through closed 
party lists,
28 so tend to be more accountable to party leaders than regional 
voters. The legislative functions of the Senate are identical to those of the 
Chamber: necessary to pass all legislation and able to vote confidence in the 
government. So the Senate constitutes a powerful veto player that slows 
down the legislative process and duplicates the functions of the Chamber. 
The problem of Senate reform has been recognized by Italian legislators 
and extensively discussed in the Bicameral Commission (1997-8). The 2001 
constitutional reform did not involve changes to the composition or function 
of the upper house, as this would have clashed with the interests of 
incumbent senators, making it impossible for the governing coalition to 
approve the constitutional changes before a general election.
29  The 
constitutional reform approved by the centre-right did address this issue, but 
its result was invalidated by the referendum. Yet the question of territorial 
representation remains a vexed one, not only due to the enhancement of 
regional competences and their enshrinement in a revised Constitution, but 
also because the direct election of regional presidents and mayors raises the 
 
 
28    The exception to this rule are the small special status regions of Val d’Aosta and Trentino-Alto-
Adige where senators are elected in uninominal constituencies.  
29   Martin Bull and Gianfranco Pasquino, “A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy”, 30(4) 
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visibility and popularity of sub-national leaders, without providing a clear 
channel for their views to be considered in national decision-making.
30 
Three limited formal mechanisms exist for managing inter-governmental 
relations in Italy, alongside some informal mechanisms developed between 
sub-national leaders to coordinate their negotiations with the central 
government. These informal mechanisms have strengthened the bargaining 
position of sub-national leaders, and also raised the salience of formal 
mechanisms for negotiations. The formal mechanisms were initially 
introduced in the 1980s, but only made permanent in 1997 as part of the 
Bassanini reforms. The most relevant of these mechanisms is the State-
Regions Conference, an advisory body of the Council of Ministers, grouping 
together all 20 regional presidents. The Conference is usually presided by the 
Minister for Regional Affairs, who is present along with a series of government 
officials. This purely consultative body is convoked on request of the State, 
which also determines the agenda for discussion. It is required for 
consultation when the central government intends to introduce legislation 
that has a major impact on regional governments. In recent years the 
Conference has vigorously discussed reforms of the health-care system, 
budget cuts, and the system of regional financing. An almost identical body 
for municipal governments exists (Conference of State, Cities, and 
Localities), as well as a Unified Conference that joins the municipal and 
regional conferences together to negotiate key legislation that affects all 
territorial governments. The Unified Conference had little relevance until 
recently, when it became the privileged avenue for negotiations on the 
proposed system of fiscal federalism, although in many instances the central 
government proceeded without a formal agreement.
31 The main innovation in 
the 2000s was a new parliamentary committee on regional issues, where 
regional leaders could act as non-voting participants, but this has never been 
activated. 
Given the weak formal mechanisms for inter-governmental relations, it is 
perhaps not surprising that local, provincial, and regional leaders have sought 
to consolidate lobby groups that promote their respective interests. The 
National Association of Italian Communes (ANCI) is a historic organization 
with presence across the national territory, and vocally represents the 
interests of local governments, primarily vis-à-vis the central government, 
but also vis-à-vis regional and provincial governments. The Union of Italian 
Provinces (UPI) has an identical function but is less visible in public debate: 
provincial leaders are not well known and this level of government is likely to 
be abolished in future. The Conference of Regional Presidents brings together 
all regional presidents and has both a political and institutional function. The 
body contributes to political debate by issuing declarations to the media 
about legislation that affects regional governments, while its members 
 
 
30   Ilenia Ruggiu‚ Contro la Camera delle Regioni. Istituzioni e prassi della rappresentanza territoriale 
(Jovene, Napoli, 2006). 
31   Camera dei Deputati, “La Conferenza permanente dei livelli di governo”, Documentazione per 
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negotiate common positions in advance of the State-Regions and United 
Conferences. Partisan differences within the Conference of Regional 
Presidents are explicitly recognized, with the president and vice-president 
drawn from opposing coalitions. The body has proved useful for reconciling 
regional interests in negotiations with the State. The Conference supported 
referendums in the late 1990s to abolish national ministries that dealt with 
exclusively regional competences. It was also generally positive in backing the 
2001 constitutional reform during the referendum campaign, despite the 
opposition of centre-right leaders at national level. Some centre-right 
regional presidents supported the reform and were willing to defy the party 
line, while others remained ambivalent about weakening party cohesion but 
did little to advance the NO campaign. The Conference did not provide 
tangible support for the 2005 constitutional reform, partly because of 
partisan differences between (mainly) centre-left regional presidents and the 
centre-right government that sponsored it. Yet there was also widespread 
concern that the legislation did little to advance regional autonomy and 
lacked any financial provisions, while the proposed Senate reform did not 
grant the type of “shared rule” that powerful regional presidents sought.32  
In recent years, partisan and territorial differences have been partly put 
aside as mayors and regional presidents unite to contest the severe reduction 
in financial transfers imposed by the central government, issuing largely 
unified positions in formal and informal bodies. Only Northern League 
regional presidents and mayors have been effectively barred from adopting 
public positions at odds with those of their party leadership, although they 
have often made apparent their displeasure at national measures. During the 
process of negotiating fiscal federalism, regional presidents of different 
affiliations were brutally critical of attempts to impose a new funding regime 
while withdrawing financial support for regions, with the centre-right regional 
president of Lombardy declaring that, with such a scale of budget cuts, 
“fiscal federalism is now dead”.
33 Yet this degree of negotiating unity may not 
be replicable in future: certain regions and localities have more to lose (or 
gain) from the shift towards “standard costs” and “own resources” envisaged 
by the new fiscal federalism legislation. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Given the current instability in the party system and the huge external 
pressures on Italy resulting from the sovereign debt crisis, it is difficult to 
make confident projections about the future dynamics of state 
decentralization. Nevertheless, it is possible to outline some likely features. 
The 2001 constitutional reform will constitute the basis for institutional 
 
 
32   Presidents of larger Italian regions tend to support the German model, where regional governments 
send delegates to the Bundesrat, in relative proportion to their population. The proposed centre-
right constitutional reform offered no more than non-voting participants from regional governments 
in future Senate proceedings. 
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design in the foreseeable future, as parliamentarians are unlikely to agree on 
anything to take its place. The immediate challenge will be to shift from a 
dysfunctional and inefficient system of sub-national financing based on 
‘historic expenditure’,  towards a system of fiscal federalism where 
expenditure by territorial governments converges around a rational formula 
based on ‘standard costs’. There will be serious difficulties in producing such 
a high degree of convergence between territorial governments of widely 
differing fiscal capacity and patterns of expenditure, especially because 
political and institutional actors see different goals in the fiscal federalism 
reform. For some, it should enhance intra-regional solidarity, while for others 
it ought to reward the richer and better administered regions. The current 
legislation is vague enough to support both positions, but strong tensions are 
likely to emerge in the phase of implementation.
34 
In the past, central governments lacked the will to punish failing 
administrations and avoid bailing out regions or municipalities in serious 
financial difficulty, especially when the dominant political culture still 
assumes that ultimate responsibility lies in Rome. Sub-national governments 
may gain an enhanced fiscal capacity, but in many cases this will be 
insufficient to compensate for the sharp and continuing decline in transfers 
from the central government. The extent to which special regions will 
contribute to the new compensating fund is another matter for speculation, 
although it is clear that the system of fiscal federalism will remain highly 
asymmetrical. Regional and local leaders are likely to continue defending 
their territorial interests vocally vis-à-vis the central government, exploiting 
whichever formal and informal mechanisms are available to them, and taking 
advantage of the current disarray among national parties to carve out 
personal spheres of autonomy. This may become a major centripetal dynamic 
in the political system,
35  alongside continued pressure from the Northern 
League for advances in regional autonomy that can finally satisfy the 
expectations of their electorate. Yet the tricky question of resolving 
competence disputes between territorial governments and the State is likely 
to continue to fall to the Constitutional Court, given the absence of any other 
institution able to do this. Further budget cuts will make it even more 
difficult for some regional governments to exercise their full range of policy 
functions, encouraging the central bureaucracy to continue legislating in 
areas of regional competence. The dynamics of decentralization will be 
characterized by strong tensions between levels of government, but without 
an institutional mechanism for their resolution, given the weakness of 
“shared rule” mechanisms at national level. Political parties in Italy are even 
less likely in future to be able to compensate for such deficiencies in 
institutional design, given their chronic organizational problems and 
paramount concern with re-positioning themselves in a fluid party system. 
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